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I. INTRODUCTION
We are in the throes of a revolution. This statement is not intended to
be melodramatic, but rather descriptive of the breathtaking moment in
which we in the communications field find ourselves. Indeed, it even may
be an understatement. Profound changes in communications will bring
dramatic and fundamental changes to every aspect of every person's life.
These changes will transform how we communicate, to whom we commu-
nicate, and from where we communicate: And, in so doing, these changes
will alter the very nature of human interaction.
Everyone has begun to see such changes. Congress heeded the warn-
* Michael K. Powell is a Republican member of the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC).
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ing signs, which rumbled like an approaching storm, and tried to prepare
for what would follow by passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(Act or 1996 Act).1 The statute is bold in its aspirations-it seeks to
change forever the legal and regulatory structure that governs the commu-
nications industry as we now know it, change the fundamental economics
that drive the industry's growth, and spur technological innovation, all in a
way that does not trample the American consumer. Thus the Act presents
momentous challenges for those of us charged with implementing its pro-
visions and overseeing such dramatic change.
The 1996 Act is lengthy and complex. It will be difficult for us to
implement fully and to give effect to the Act's some 750,000 words, and it
will likely be quite some time before we realize fully the fruits of our ef-
forts. Along the way, there will be dark moments: doubts, recriminations,
defections, and even failure. Yet, there will assuredly be successes in the
form of innovative breakthroughs, new choices, and new services. The
critical point is that implementation will require a long campaign, and we
cannot be distracted by tiresome discussions about whether the Act is a
2
success or failure merely two years after its passage. Revolutions rarely
take place overnight. Policymakers' efforts to open long-distance markets
began over a decade ago. Yet notwithstanding the procompetitive benefits
of this deregulation, AT&T still serves at least half of all long-distance
customers.' The airline and rail industries have encountered their own
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1997)).
2. The observation that implementation will be a complicated and lengthy process ap-
pears to be valid with respect to countries other than the United States. For example, in its
September 13, 1997 survey of the telecommunications industry, the Economist magazine
noted the "experience in those countries that have already begun to dismantle their mo-
nopolies-including the United States.. .- shows how hard it is to create competition in
telephone networks. The old telephone monopolies will almost certainly still be powerful
companies... years from now." Frances Cairncross, A Connected World, EcONOMIST, Sept.
13, 1997, at S3; see also Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights, and
Competition of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (Sept. 17, 1997) ("[T]he task of
introducing competition to these historically closed markets is an enormous and difficult
one that could not, even under the best circumstances, have been accomplished by now.")
(testimony of Mark C. Rosenblum, AT&T Vice President).
3. The Commission's third quarter 1997 analysis of AT&T's percentage of the long-
distance market-based on switched access minutes, presubscribed lines and revenue-
indicates a market share hovering around 50%. See INDUSTRY ANALYSIs DIv., COMMON
CARRIER BUREAU, FCC, LONG DISTANCE MARKET SHARE: THIRD QUARTER 1997 (Jan.
1998). AT&T's percentage of access minutes for the third quarter 1997 was 52.3%. Id. at 3.
Furthermore, the company's percentage of presubscribed lines (for December 1996) was
63.3%. Id. at 9. Finally, the percentage of revenue (based on operating revenues of long-
distance carriers only) for 1996 was 47.9%. Id. at 16.
Prior to the antitrust consent decree (the so-called Modified Final Judgment or MFJ)
entered by Judge Harold H. Greene in connection with United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp.
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problems in the difficult, yet beneficial, process of deregulation. 4 In asses-
sing our progress in implementing the Act, we must focus on what is
working, and what is not, striving always to make sure that if we inadver-
tently take one step backward in our efforts, we take at least two steps for-
ward soon thereafter. By doing so, we will stay focused on the ultimate
objective and not get mired in short-sighted or irrelevant skirmishes along
the way.
Communications policymakers must not be content to respond and
react to the dynamic changes that are before us. The rough surf of change
would undoubtedly smash us against the rocks were we to do so. Instead,
as in any revolution, we must lead-boldly and decisively. While lawyers
will debate the details of regulations, economists the most efficient terms
and conditions, and technologists the most advanced solutions for this new
era, communications policy leaders must concern themselves with the
most profound change required by this revolution-the change in culture
and focus required of regulators, industry players, politicians, and consum-
ers. We have spent the better part of our careers and lives in the context of
a highly regulatory paradigm, and it will require great effort and courage
for us to abandon this paradigm to navigate the swift current of change in
communications that is being unleashed by market forces and deregula-
tion.
In this Essay, let me address how I believe we regulators should
change. How do we transform ourselves from managers of regulation to
leaders of revolution? What principles should guide communications lead-
ers? What should communications leaders focus on? In offering answers to
these questions, I will set out my own guiding principles for leading in the
communications revolution.
131 (D.D.C. 1982), affid, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), AT&T supplied approximately 80% to
90% of all long-distance service. See PAUL W. MAcAvoY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST AND
REGULATION TO ESTABLISH COMPETION IN LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICE 8 (1996).
4. Many airlines endured a period of reduced earnings during the transition to compe-
tition. Several incumbent carriers, like Braniff, Continental, Eastern, Pan Am, as well as
many new entrants were dissolved or went bankrupt. The elimination of regulation on the
industry also allowed incumbent carriers "to abandon routes and change the time of indi-
vidual flights, and lifted price controls so that the airlines could adjust fares to meet the
competition." See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy
of Forvard Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1068, 1113 (1997).
The rail industry experienced its own unique fits-and-starts; deregulation had a sig-
nificant effect on rates and abandonments. Id. at 1114. The industry also underwent a period
of major consolidation: The Chessie System and Seaboard Coast Line partnered to form
CSX in 1980; the Burlington Northern merged with the Santa Fe; and the Union Pacific
partnered with both the Southern Pacific and the Chicago and North Western Transporta-
tion Company. Id. at 1114-15.
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II. THE PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNICATIONS LEADERSHIP
To prevail in the communications revolution, those of us charged
with leadership responsibilities must take to heart several critical princi-
ples. First, we must be well-schooled in the fields of economics and com-
petitive analysis, and be truly committed to the belief that competition and
markets will ultimately prove superior devices for managing change. Sec-
ond, we must be "technology wise," respecting at once the promise, practi-
calities, and uncontrollable development of technology. Third, we must be
decisive-driven by facts and ideas, not emotion or special interest poli-
tics. And, in character, we must be humble enough to admit our errors
quickly and courageous enough to change course when events demand.
Most importantly, we must, like the industries we regulate, be creative and
innovative. Let me elaborate on these principles.
A. Promote Competition
In the communications policy arena, deregulation and competition
are quickly approaching motherhood and apple pie as the things most de-
serving of our unfailing support. Yet, when we look carefully at
"procompetitive" policies urged from different quarters, we see that not
everyone means the same thing. Policymakers and advocates continue to
advance rules that are derived from an unstated belief that regulators are
better equipped to decide what is best for consumers rather than consumers
making their own choices in a competitive market. Dressing up such
regulation in "procompetitive" clothing does not eviscerate its flawed un-
derlying premise.
I believe devoutly that this great communications revolution demands
a much more committed and sincere faith in consumers and free markets.
Several factors compel this conclusion. First, if nothing else, I believe
Congress commanded in the 1996 Act that we move smartly from a regu-S5
latory model to a procompetitive, deregulatory environment. Second, in
my mind, world economic history tells us quite clearly that industrial
greatness flows from free and competitive markets. This is the most poign-
5. In the text of the 1996 Act, Congress directed the Commission to "promote compe-
tition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for
American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new tele-
communications technologies." See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56, 56 (preamble) (emphasis added). In addition, the legislative history of the
1996 Act reveals that Congress intended "to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory
national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of ad-
vanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Americans by
opening all telecommunications markets to competition." See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458
at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 124 (emphases added).
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ant lesson of the Cold War. Markets are far superior devices than central
planning models for controlling prices, spurring innovation, enhancing
quality, and producing consumer choice. Third, we must yield to competi-
tive markets because the blistering pace of technological change will toler-
ate nothing else. It is futile for bureaucratic regulatory agencies to attempt
to keep pace with the demands of high technology markets. We cannot
possibly predict accurately the direction and impact of fast changing tech-
nology, nor are we able to guess correctly whether or not consumers will
embrace one technology or another. Yet, too many regulators mouth the
words of the procompetition catechism, while still attempting to "manage"
competition and technological evolution. As communications leaders, we
must instead accept and be guided by a few truths about competition.
1. Competition Means Winners and Losers
It is axiomatic that in any competition someone must win and others
must lose. In a truly competitive market, the firms that win are, as a gen-
eral matter, those that provide the greatest value to customers at the lowest
cost. As technology, consolidation, and other forces change firms' cost
structures and as customer tastes (i.e., what they consider valuable) evolve,
it should not be surprising that firms that were once the winners sometimes
begin to lose. Losing is not inevitable; a finm may adapt to changing cir-
cumstances and thus prevent, or at least postpone, its own demise. But in a
competitive environment, the market ultimately punishes those firms that
fail to provide value or manage their costs, even if these firms are the rich-
est and most established firms in the industry.
We must accept this fact and avoid the traditional tendency of regu-
lators to protect firms or industry segments in exchange for promised re-
sults for consumers. It simply is not possible to offer every firm a soft
landing, yet those that adapt and offer high value to consumers will un-
doubtedly survive. The paternalistic and protectionist instincts of regula-
tory agencies are easily illustrated. For example, the FCC's "must-carry"
and retransmission obligations were imposed on cable system operators to
minimize the threat of widely available cable service to the continued vi-
6
ability of free, over-the-air broadcast television licensees. Similar obliga-
6. In 1993, the Commission adopted must-carry and retransmission consent rules pur-
suant to the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act and the Competition Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); see also
Implementation of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
Brdcst. Signal Carriage Issues, Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 2965, 72 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 204 (1993). The must-carry provision requires cable companies to carry the signals of
commercial and noncommercial television broadcast stations that are in the same "local"
television market as the cable service provider. See, e.g., Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
tions have been considered for other fledgling multichannel video provid-
ers out of concern about the impact on a few broadcasting firms.7 What one
observes is that regulated entities tend to favor competition to the extent
that it allows them to enter new markets. But these same firms are heard to
scream foul when it comes to allowing other firms with newer, cheaper,
and/or better products and services into their markets. As has become the
custom, these firms rush to Washington and to state capitals, demanding
that policymakers save them from competition. And, all too often, policy-
makers respond to the cries of these firms by imposing this or that condi-
tion on their newer rivals, all in the name of promoting the public interest
and preserving the complaining firms' ability to compete.
One reason that policymakers find it difficult, even after setting ap-
propriate ground rules, to allow the market to run its course is, ironically,
their fear of ceding control to the marketplace. The Act commands poli-
cymakers and industry to move away from the monopoly-oriented, over-
regulatory origins of communications policy and toward a world in which
the market, rather than bureaucracy, determines how communications re-
sources should be utilized. Yet, so often, we cannot actually bring our-
selves to let go-to jump off our regulatory perch. It is true that risks await
in free markets: risk that the consumers will be harmed by anticompetitive
conduct on the part of firms with market power; risk that communications
companies may be acquired, downsized, or driven out of business; and risk
that some individuals will not vie successfully for the many choice jobs
that competition will create.
Though these fears are not inconsequential, they nearly always are
overstated and tend to paralyze us from taking action that would allow
markets to flourish and competition to grow.8 Instead, we speculate about
117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997) (affirming the must-carry provision because, inter alia, "Congress'
interests of preserving benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, promoting
widespread dissemination of information from multiplicity of sources, and promoting fair
competition in market for television programming were important governmental interests
for First Amendment purposes."); THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONs LAW
AND POLICY 354-76 (1994). The retransmission consent provision prohibits cable service
providers and other multichannel video programming distributors from transmitting the sig-
nals of local television broadcast stations without first obtaining their consent. Id. at 343-54.
For a general description of policymakers' efforts to forestall the development of cable, see
ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 156-60 (1983).
7. For example, under H.R. 3210, the Copyright Compulsory License Improvement
Act introduced by Rep. Howard Coble (R-N.C.), satellite broadcast providers, including
direct broadcast satellite (DBS) and direct-to-home (DTH), would be required to comply
with the same regulations that cable service providers are obligated to follow. In relevant
part, the bill would require satellite broadcast providers to comply with must-carry rules and
other regulations. See H.R. 3210, 105th Cong., §§ 10-11 (1997).
8. The MFJ limited the BOCs, after divestment, to the "business of supplying local
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possible anticompetitive effects and then adopt policies intended to protect
new entrants and consumers from them. Rather than protect these interests,
however, we more often, in practical effect, handicap the market and post-
pone the arrival of competition and consumer choice. Communications
leaders must not give in to these fears so lightly, but instead must have the
courage to trust the market. Besides, if feared anticompetitive conduct ac-
tually occurs, it usually can be adequately addressed by the antitrust
authorities.
As communications policy leaders we must resist the understandable
temptation to calm our fear of the risks inherent in competitive markets by
giving in to firms' demands to save them from competition. These firms
ask us not to promote competition, but rather protectionism. More specifi-
cally, by shielding mature industry participants from the pressures of hav-
ing to adapt to the presence of new entrants, we merely prevent these new
entrants from offering customers greater value at lower prices, while si-
multaneously rewarding incumbents for providing no new value to the
economy other than income for armies of lobbyists. Succumbing too often
to pleas for relief from competition, or cries for regulatory action to "level
the playing field" between providers of old and new services, will short-
circuit the deregulatory process by which markets replace regulators as the
ultimate allocators of resources within the industry. Conversely, when we
condemn incumbents to their existing lines of business and services we
often stifle innovation by sophisticated firms that may be uniquely posi-
tioned to provide significant benefits to consumers.
2. Understand Business, Economic, and Market Realities
In a competitive environment, decisions are made by business people
and consumers. Thus, in order to promote national policies in a free market
system, regulators must understand fully business and economic realities.
We must take account of the variables that inform decisions by company
executives-the returns on investment, the cost of capital, the efficiencies
and synergies of choices. Only by understanding these variables can we
policy leaders make thoughtful choices about how to satisfy national goals
in a manner that is consistent with competition, rather than in a manner
that is at cross-purposes with it. Of growing significance is the degree to
which our decisions affect the flow of capital. If we are slow in our delib-
erations or ambiguous in our pronouncements, we will introduce uncer-
tainty into the marketplace and, consequently, expose those who invest the
telephone service." See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 186-95, 225-34 (D.D.C.
1982) (establishing line of business restrictions on the Bell Operating Companies after di-
vestment), afftd, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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capital that drives the economic engine to additional, unnecessary risk.
There is an equally important reason that policy leaders should un-
derstand the business perspective: if we do not, we will find it difficult to
distinguish between when the concerns of interested parties are substantial
and genuine and when these firms are acting like Chicken Little-crying
unnecessarily that the sky is falling. To avoid this problem, we absolutely
must take the time to learn how business people see the market, why a
company is or is not willing to invest another dollar in a given initiative or
market, and what barriers exist to entering new markets.
Understanding the business and economic realities of the communi-
cations market will allow policy leaders to accomplish several things that I
believe are critical to promoting competition:
Channeling Firms' Self Interest. There is an unfortunate tendency in
the communications realm to rely on policies that depend for their
implementation upon a company or an industry acting against its own
self-interest.9 This reliance is entirely misplaced. It is a first principle
of micro-economics that any firm will act in its self-interest and seek
to maximize profits. ° Indeed, competitive markets depend on firms
adhering to that principle. Communications leaders must recognize
this basic economic premise and craft policies that are consistent with
it. That is, we must put aside the traditional tendency to impose
regulations that are at cross-purposes with businesses' profit-seeking
incentives and instead pursue our objectives in a way that will prompt
firms to make decisions (in their self-interest) that ultimately facili-
tate our public policy goals.
Addressing Social Policy Goals in Context. Markets and competition
are primarily the domain of economics-not social policy. That is not
9. For example, some would argue that the FCC's proceedings to implement section
271 of the Act, according to which the BOCs may apply for authority to provide long-
distance service within their regions, comprise one such policy. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271
(West Supp. 1997). In order to gain authority to enter the long-distance market, BOCs must
demonstrate to the FCC that they have taken sufficient steps to open local markets and
thereby help would-be competitors in the local market steal away the BOCs' own custom-
ers. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (requiring that incumbent local telephone
companies provide competitors with interconnection and nondiscriminatory access to un-
bundled network elements). This policy assumes that BOCs have stronger incentives to get
into the long-distance market than they have to keep competitors out of the local market.
10. ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 1
(1970) (citing I ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 421 (Edwin Canaan ed., 4th ed. 1925) (1776)); see also ERNEST GELLHORN &
WILLIAM E. KovAcIc, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 48-50 (1994).
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to say that we cannot pursue social good in a competitive market. It
does mean, however, that we must do so in a manner that is consis-
tent with bedrock economic principles or we will be ignoring the re-
alities of the market." Among other things, communications leaders
should be highly skeptical of policies that appear to expect (or co-
erce) altruism from profit-maximizing entities. Rather, to accomplish
social good, we must find ways to convince firms that being a good
corporate citizen is good for business and offer firms economic in-
centives to reach our social policy goals.
The Dangers of "Big Guy Myopia." Policymakers, especially those
inside the Beltway, exhibit an unfortunate tendency to lose sight of
the efforts of smaller telecommunications companies to enter new
markets. I refer to this tendency as "big guy myopia.' 2 The value of
our procompetitive policies cannot be measured solely according to
whether the top three interexchange carriers favor or flourish under
them, just as we cannot measure such value based solely on the expe-
riences of the Bell Operating Companies. The same is true of all
other sectors of the communications world. Often the most creative
energy in any emerging, innovative market comes from small- to me-
dium-sized firms infected with the American entrepreneurial spirit. 3
11. I, for example, have made clear my support for the universal service programs that
the FCC has a duty to implement under the Act. See Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal
Serv., Fourth Order on Reconsideration, CC Dkt. No. 96-45, Access Charge Reform, Price
Cap Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Transport Rate Structure and Pricing, End User
Common Line Charge, Report and Order, CC Dkt. Nos. 96-262, 94-1, 91-213, 95-72, 1997
WL 797532 (Dec. 30, 1997) (separate statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell). At
the same time, however, I have said that we must diligently police the growth of universal
service programs, which are funded by telecommunications companies, lest such growth
imperil carriers' efforts to bring the benefits of competition and innovation to consumers. If
subsidy programs get out of hand, they can dramatically raise competitors' costs and skew
the economic incentives to enter markets. I also believe strongly that policies that assist and
or promote minorities and women can be very good for business. See Michael K. Powell,
Lessons from the Underground Railroad, Speech Before the Douglass Policy Institute,
Washington, D.C. (Feb. 17, 1998) (transcript available at
<http:lwww.fcc.gov/commissioners/powelll>) [hereinafter Lessons from the Underground
Railroad Speech]; Michael K. Powell, Speech Before the NAB Radio Group Head Fly,
Washington, D.C. (Feb. 18, 1998) (transcript available at
<http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/powelll>) [hereinafter NAB Speech].
12. See, e.g., Michael K. Powell, Speech Before the America's Carriers Telecommuni-
cations Association, McLean, Va. (Dec. 15, 1997) (transcript available at
<http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/powelll>).
13. Many of these smaller companies are making competitive inroads by offering wire-
line, wireless, Internet access, and other services-sometimes in geographic areas outside
what are generally considered to be the top markets. For example, the Association for Local
Telecommunications Services (ALTS) reports that there are over 100 competitive local
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
In promoting competition we cannot focus narrowly on large firms
that have profited heavily from (and are thus somewhat invested in)
the regulatory system. To do so is to risk making policies based on
the past rather than on the future.
By understanding the business and economic realities of the communica-
tions market, and using this knowledge to channel firms' self-interest, ad-
dress social policy goals in the broader competitive context, and avoid "big
guy myopia," policy leaders stand a much greater chance of instituting
procompetitive policies that are effective and that do not distort or inad-
vertently forestall the development of competition.
B. Respect the Promise and Practicalities of Technology
The second bedrock principle of communications policy leadership is
that we must respect the practicalities, promise, and uncontrollable devel-
opment of technology. The promise of technology is, in the long run, infi-
nite. It is unassailable that nearly every major development in the commu-
nications industry has come on the heels of a new development or
application of technology. MCI challenged AT&T's dominance in long-
distance through creative use of microwave technology. 4 Fiber optic cable
revolutionized and spurred competition in long-distance and is doing the
telephone companies which control 1.4 million access lines and which generate $2.7 billion
in revenues. En Banc Presentation on State of Local Telephone Competition Before the
FCC 8 (Jan. 29, 1998) (statement of Heather Gold, President, ALTS) (transcript available at
<http://www.fcc.gov/enbanc/>) [hereinafter Telephone Competition Presentation]. A com-
pany called RCN is providing facilities-based service to residential customers in at least
three cities by offering a bundle of voice, video, and Internet access service. Id. at 33
(statement of Michael Mahoney, President and COO, RCN Corp.). Cox Communications,
Inc. enjoys a 17% penetration rate in communities in which it has provided cable telephony
for at least two months. Id. at 50 (statement of Alex Netchvolodoff, Vice-President, Cox
Enterprises, Inc.). ACSI generated nearly $40 million in revenues for the first three quarters
of 1997 by providing facilities-based service to business customers in small- and medium-
sized urban areas in the South. Id. at 59 (statement of Jack Reich, President and CEO,
ACSI). USN has the ability to serve small and medium-sized businesses in eighteen states
through resale. Id. at 63 (statement of Dennis Dundon, CEO, USN Communications).
14. In 1963, Microwave Communications Inc., predecessor to MCI Communications
Corporation, submitted an application to the Commission to construct microwave facilities
to provide microwave radio service between Chicago and St. Louis, and along nine imme-
diate points, which was approved six years later. See Applications of Microwave Comm.,
Inc. For Construction Permits To Establish New Facils. in the Domestic Pub. Point-to-Point
Microwave Radio Serv. at Chicago, Ill., St. Louis, Mo., and Intermediate Points, Decision,
18 F.C.C.2d 953, 16 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1037, reconsideration denied by Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 190, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 226 (1970). MCI was the
first microwave carrier to compete against AT&T for long-distance customers. See
MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 12.3.2, 596-97
(1992).
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same in local telephony and multichannel video markets.15  Advances in
cellular and PCS technology have rapidly ushered in a new era of mobile
communications. 16 Satellite promises to do the same. Furthermore, even
though many thought it a physical impossibility just a number of years
ago, digital television promises to completely transform that industry and
the viewing experiences of consumers.
The evolution of technology is awesome and inevitable. I often say
that we must take account of the fact that at any moment there is a kid in a
basement or garage somewhere working on some new technology that will
revolutionize our understanding of what technology can and cannot do in
the world of communications. We must keep that in mind and make sure
that we are not prevented from utilizing such breakthrough technology be-
cause we have committed ourselves to something else, or conferred a
competitive advantage to a specific type or use of technology. It is fool-
hardy to try to pick technology winners or to try to anticipate consumer re-
sponses to such technology. 8 Markets always have proven to be better than
15. Sprint, the third of the large interexchange carriers, made use of another frontier
technology when it began to invest heavily in fiber optics. Sprint, a partnership of inde-
pendent local exchange carriers GTE and United Telecom, like its contemporary MCI,
needed new technological capability to deploy advanced broadband services to potential
long-distance customers. See John M. Phelan et al., Panel III: Implications of the New Tele-
communications Legislation, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 517, 531 (1996)
("Sprint was the first... long-distance company to have a nationwide fiber optic digital
network. Sprint entered the market and became successful with 'pin drop' quality sound.").
Local exchange and cable carriers are also beginning to "lay fiber" rapidly in antici-
pation of the digital revolution and a panoply of interactive, multimedia applications. See
Joseph A. Pantoja, Note, Desirable Economic Cooperation Among High-Technology In-
dustries: A Look at Telephone and Cable, 1994 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 617, 655 ("Both local
telephone and cable companies intend to become full-service providers of everything from
on-line shopping and movies on demand, to two-way communications services over fiber
optic networks, to interactive games. Accordingly, both cable companies and telephone
companies are investing heavily in fiber optics.").
16. See William B. Garrison, Jr. & Leslie A. Taylor, Wireless Telecom Innovations:
New Players, New Structures, New Regulation, COMM. LAWYER, Winter 1994, at 1.
17. One of the greatest tributes to American technological leadership and enterprise
was the race to develop high-definition television and ultimately digital HDTV. It is abso-
lutely true that engineers in Japan, Europe and even the United States believed that the
creation of digital, high-definition television was technologically, if not scientifically, im-
possible. Nevertheless, the device which could not be developed, was developed. A team of
engineers in California created a digital, high-definition television platform. And in the af-
termath, the analog MUSE system developed by the Japanese was rendered economically
and technologically worthless. See JOEL BRINKLEY, DEFINING VISION: THE BATrLE FOR THE
FuTuRE OF TELEVISION (1997).
18. History is filled with examples of failed predictions about technological innovation
and progress. The New York Times editorialized in 1939 on the occasion of the introduction
of television at the World's Fair that television "will never be a serious competitor for radio
because people must sit and keep their eyes glued on a screen; the average American family
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
regulators at empowering consumers to bring technology and services to
their highest and best uses.
On the other hand, there are real practical limitations of technology.
Some may remember the margarine commercial that ran in the 1970s that
said: "It's not nice to fool mother nature!" Well, in making policies in
which technology is involved, it is not nice (or ultimately possible) to cut
against the limits of science and the constraints of time and money. We
must guard against what I call "techno-euphoria." That is, policy leaders
must not be swept along by over-blown promises that technology is the
immediate panacea for all of our ills. Failure to respect the limitations of
science and technology leads to ineffective policies based on faulty as-
sumptions and the risk that the weakness of such policies may create
problems for related policies. For example, as we all know, the confidence
surrounding the belief that local competition would arrive shortly after the
Act was passed can be attributed, in part, to the faulty assumption that ca-
ble companies need only flip a switch to become instant phone compa-
nies.19 If policy leaders had fully understood the limits of existing technol-
ogy, they would have realized that cable telephony had real short-term
limitations because of the way cable networks were configured. Cable te-
lephony was not going to happen overnight.20
All this said, communications leaders must strive to be "technology-
wise"-meaning that they should make a concerted effort to study the de-
tails of networks and emerging technologies so as to make more informed
hasn't time for it." FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, THE DEATH OF DISTANCE: How THE COMMU-
NICATIONS REVOLUTnON WILL CHANGE OUR LIvES 59 (1997). Only a few short years ago
many expressed with certainty that cellular telephones would remain a small niche market
with only 900,000 users by the year 2000. See CELLULAR TELECOMM. IND. ASS'N, BRINGING
INFORMATION TO PEOPLE, CELEBRATING THE WIRELESS DECADE 45 (1993) (referring to
AT&T market research). Today more than 54 million Americans subscribe to wireless
services. See Elizabeth Jensen, Wireless Carriers Try New Hook to Win Customers, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 4, 1998, at B4.
19.
[M]eaningful facilities-based competition is possible, given that cable services are
available to more than 95 percent of United States homes. Some of the initial for-
ays of cable companies into the field of local telephony therefore hold the promise
of providing the sort of local residential competition that has consistently been
contemplated.
H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 148 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 160.
20. Decker Anstrom, President of the National Cable Television Association (NCTA),
noted that the optimistic predictions were in retrospect "wrong... nearly everyone donned
rosy glasses when we predicted how quickly competition would come. And I say, 'we' be-
cause the cable industry-me included-participated in these overly optimistic forecasts."
See NCTA, Cox Begin Lobbying Push for No Changes to Current Rules, VIDEO COMPE-
TITION REP., Feb. 9, 1998, at 3. In this third year of the momentous transformation at the
federal level to a competitive telecommunications regime, a handful of cable service pro-
viders are beginning limited trials or commercial deployment of cable telephony.
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policy decisions. Such study should, to the extent possible, involve field
trips to the facilities of those we regulate to see first-hand how things are
working.
In addition, communications leaders must recognize that the avail-
ability of capital poses a real constraint on whether and when new technol-
ogy will provide alternative avenues for firms to enter new telecommuni-
cations markets. Thus, in order to understand how policies may (or may
not) encourage market entry, policy leaders must be sensitive to how the
capital markets are evaluating our efforts and the efforts of companies that
• . 21
might use market-opening technology.
Finally, in order to capitalize on the promise of technology, we also
must respect the need for speed. Communications markets abhor uncer-
tainty and demand timely responses. A decision by a firm or a regulator in
these markets that is right, but too late, might as well not have been made
at all. Moore's law holds that the maximum processing power of a micro-
chip, at a given price, doubles roughly every eighteen months.22 Policy
leaders would be well-advised to adopt the urgency that Moore's law sug-
gests in formulating policies for fast-moving communications and high
technology markets.
C. Be Courageous and Decisive
The third principle that I believe should guide communications lead-
ers in a dynamic, fast-moving communications market is that such leaders
should act courageously and decisively. These markets and the firms that
are operating in them are extremely impatient. Opportunity may knock
more than once, but it may only stay for a brief second. Such an environ-
ment demands that regulators issue clear and timely decisions. We no
longer have the luxury we enjoyed with regulated monopolies to spend
years reaching a decision on a matter. The opportunity and the capital will
not wait. To be decisive will require courage, because there are always
forces that have a vested interest in delay. There often are also real politi-
21. Take utilities as an example. Although utilities are an obvious candidate for pro-
viding phone service, they are inhibited by the fact that most Wall Street portfolio managers
view them as a conservative investment that adds stability to their holdings and Wall Street
seems loath to put capital at risk for such companies to enter new markets. Yet, Teligent, a
new fixed-wireless start-up company seems to attract a phenomenal amount of capital with
little more to their credit thus far than some spectrum and a good idea. See Peter Haynes,
Teligent's Test, FORBES, Mar. 9, 1998, at 202. Conversely, Wall Street valuation may pun-
ish larger firms that are seen by many as steady dividend companies and not as entrepreneu-
rial ones.
22. See FCC, OPP WORKING PAPER, DIGITAL TORNADO: THE INTEEr AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY (authored by Kevin Werbach) 6 (1997).
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cal and litigation consequences to decisions. We cannot let such consid-
erations bog us down or paralyze us from getting decisions to market.
Firms in these markets need answers; even unwelcome answers are better
than being left in limbo. As we were fond of saying when I was in the
Army: "Right or wrong, do something. You can die just standing still."
To be decisive, a communications leader must act on ideas, princi-
ples, and substance and not be buffeted by emotional rhetoric or special
interest concerns. Only in this way can we act quickly and unambiguously,
for then we will have the confidence that we have made the best decision
we can, based on the facts and arguments presented to us. Too often we
address the concerns of groups that, with the best of intentions, have asked
us to impose, modify, eliminate, or even retain a particular policy simply
because these groups would benefit from such action. Representatives of
these groups may pay lip service to our statutory obligations, the broader
policy implications, and the political and economic context. They may
make poor judgments about what can realistically be accomplished in the
foreseeable future, or no judgments at all. If we allow the policy agenda to
be driven by special interests, in the end we will do no good. Policy leaders
may be pleased when we establish some constituent's pet program, but if
such programs are not thoughtful and well-reasoned, they will not endure.
Policy leaders and those who lobby them must fight with ideas, rather
than emotions. They must be creative and resourceful. In the communica-
tions arena, there is an unfortunate tendency to become wedded to specific
policy proposals. We must, of course, have policy priorities and goals, but
all too often, policymakers and advocates alike are unwilling to consider
new ways of achieving these goals--even after the efficacy of the estab-
lished ways is temporarily or permanently undermined by legal, economic,
or technological developments. Advocates and policy leaders at all levels
must find the courage to step away from failed or seriously weakened poli-
cies and replace them with new ones better suited to new circumstances.
As you may know, I have attempted to offer creative solutions to
problems in my role as Commissioner. For example, I offered my thoughts
on reforming the process by which the FCC implements section 271 of the
Act, under which Bell Operating Companies may obtain authority to pro-
vide long-distance service within their operating regions after satisfying
section 271's "competitive checklist." In a White Paper I issued in January
of this year, I offered my thoughts on how to flesh out what I termed a
"collaborative, multidimensional approach" to interpreting and applying
section 271.21 The goal of this approach is to resolve many checklist com-
23. There would be three dimensions to this collaborative process: (1) a national as-
sessment conducted by the Commission, in collaboration with the States and Justice De-
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pliance issues for a given state well before an application for that state is
filed. I also have set out principles that I believe should govern our pursuit
of the worthy goal of promoting the involvement of minorities and women
in communications. Specifically, I have urged advocates and policymakers
to (1) pursue race- and gender-neutral policies; (2) encourage private-
sector initiatives; (3) jettison the self-evident rationales of the past; (4)
pursue economics-based initiatives; and (5) look for "win-win" policies.
By sharing my thoughts on these and other subjects, I did not wish to
suggest that my ideas should constitute the final game plan with respect to
these subjects. Rather, I have found that offering detailed thoughts on a
subject is often the most effective way to stir productive debate and, ulti-
mately, work toward achievement of policy goals. I encourage other poli-
cymakers and interested parties to do the same.
I. THE Focus OF COMMUNICATIONS LEADERS
In light of the above principles, where should communications lead-
ers focus their energies in the coming years? I have a few suggestions:
Innovation. A true communications policy leader will recognize that
the only constant in the communications industry is change. Innova-
tion breeds new markets, and shatters the entrenched advantages of
incumbency, as the recent history of communications has shown.2 As
partment; (2) development of state-tailored and regional solutions to checklist compliance;
and (3) evaluation of the application, once filed. See Michael K. Powell, Essay, Wake Up
Call: FCC Commissioner Michael Powell Calls For New Collaborative Approach to Sec-
tion 271 Applications (Jan. 15, 1998) <http:lwww.fcc.gov/commissioners/powelll>.
24. See, e.g., Lessons from the Underground Railroad Speech, supra note 11; NAB
Speech, supra note 11.
25. See, e.g., supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. Traditionally distinct technol-
ogy and services are poised to attack each other. Cable service providers are investing bil-
lions of dollars in capital improvements and technology so that they can offer high-speed,
broadband Internet access, digital television and radio, and competitive local and long-
distance telephone service. See Bringing Competition to Local Telephony: The Department
of Justice's Perspective, Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Antitrust, Business Rights, and
Competition of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Joel I.
Klein, Assistant Attorney General DOJ Antitrust Division); see also Telephone Competition
Presentation, supra note 13, at 43-51 (statement of Alex Netchvolodoff, Vice-President,
Cox Enterprises, Inc.) (detailing Cox's provision of local and long-distance telephone serv-
ice, high-speed data service, digital telephony, and digital television, and stating that Cox
will offer these services to 85% of its cable customer base by the end of 1999). Telephone
companies are testing cable services. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in
Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, Fourth Annual Report, CS Dkt. No. 97-
141, 1998 WL 10229 (Jan. 13, 1998). There is wireless cable, fixed wireless telephony, and
wireless Internet. The Internet itself is one of the greatest examples of technological inno-
vation.
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such, policy leaders must, even as they strive to correct short-term
problems, work to avoid slowing the pace of innovation in technol-
ogy and service offerings, and promote such activity as much as pos-
sible.2
Regulatory and Technical Convergence. Communications historically
has been regulated (or not regulated) according to the method of
transmission: telephone companies are regulated under Title II of the
Act, radio companies are generally regulated under Title I, cable
companies are regulated under Title VI, and so on. Such regulatory
balkanization was sustainable in the era before digitalization, when
services offered via one method of transmission could not, as a gen-
eral matter, be offered via a second method of transmission in a man-
ner that would lead customers to view the two services as substitutes
for each other. Policymakers, however, are fast approaching moments
of truth in which we will have to decide whether services similar to
those traditionally offered over one medium should be regulated in
the same manner as new services offered over another medium--or
whether new services should be regulated at all. Should cable and
Internet telephony be regulated in the same manner as traditional
wireline telephony? Should we allow traditional wireline telephone
companies to take root in the rich soil of deregulation to grow new
innovative services as have Internet service providers? Should cable
and direct broadcast satellite services be regulated in the same man-
ner? Why or why not? As technology erases the differences between
these services, communications policy leaders will need to reconcile
conflicting regulatory approaches in a way that reinforces forward-
thinking, procompetitive approaches and discards outdated ap-
proaches.
Enforcement. Communications policy has historically emphasized
prospective, prophylactic regulation, whereby companies providing
26. In attempting to foster innovation, it is my view that communications policy leaders
should, among other things, consider whether or not the firm responsible for making a par-
ticular innovation should be allowed to exclude other firms from receiving the benefit of
that innovation. As one court of appeals explained:
It is the possibility of success in the marketplace, attributable to superior perform-
ance, that provides the incentives on which the proper functioning of our com-
petitive economy rests. If a firm that has engaged in the risks and expenses of re-
search and development were required in all circumstances to share with its rivals
the benefits of those endeavors, this incentive would very likely be vitiated.
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
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one type of service were regulated with respect to the way they pro-
vided that service and were legally precluded from offering other
types of services. This approach has tended to preserve the arbitrary
regulatory distinctions that technological innovation acts to eliminate.
Antitrust law, however, illustrates an alternative approach--one that
emphasizes performance measurement and vigorous enforcement
rather than prospective regulation. Communications policy leaders
should look to enforcement as a means to protect the public against
certain identifiable harms without hindering companies from im-
proving their existing offerings and entering new markets that lie out-
side their traditional regulatory boundaries.
Regulatory Efficiency. Regulators at the state and federal levels have
come under increasing criticism because of the glacial pace that often
characterizes the regulatory process. All too often, companies find
themselves begging regulators to make a decision-any decision-in
order to resolve uncertainty in the industry, even if that means adop-
tion of a policy that disfavors the companies begging for such action.
These companies would rather cope with an adverse result than watch
their business plans deteriorate in the face of regulatory uncertainty.
Communications policy leaders must always strive to create new
ways to develop and implement policies that will lead more quickly
to well-reasoned results.
I firmly believe that by focusing on these areas, communications policy
leaders will be able to sidestep the many "red herring" debates that would
keep them from devoting their full attention to the achievement of a fully
competitive, innovation-driven market in telecommunications.
IV. CONCLUSION
We all recognize that the development of the telecommunications in-
dustry will remain critical to our economy. I believe that communications
policy leaders should facilitate this development so as to (1) promote com-
petition, (2) respect the practicalities and promise of technology, and (3)
focus on ideas, rather than emotion, as I have said here.
But policy leaders are not indispensable. I firmly believe that, even if
policy leaders do nothing, competition and technology will march on,
though perhaps in inefficient ways. As technology evolves, even the most
entrenched monopolists will, in the long run, find themselves supplanted
by newcomers who can build a better or cheaper mousetrap. This does not
mean that policy leaders should avoid the hard work of tearing down the
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market barriers that law, economics, or history have erected, just that we
should not delude ourselves that our actions are more important than those
of competitors in the marketplace.
As we policy leaders tackle the intellectually and psychologically
draining task of facilitating telecommunications reform, we need to muster
the courage to yield our regulatory primacy to the market. I firmly believe
that if we accomplish this task, those who look back on our efforts years
from now will be able to do so with admiration.
